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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
L. BURT BIGLER and HERBERr.t,
K. SLOANE,
Plaintiffs.
-v~.---

RAY P. GREEX\YOOD, GEORGE \V.
~IORGAK
and LAWRENCE A .
.JOXES, as Commissioners of Salt
Lake County, and as Directors of
the Salt Lake CitY Suburban Sewer
District,
.
Defendants,
and

Cas~

No. 7915

SALT LAI{E COUNTY SUBUR,BAN
IJIPROVE~fENT
ASSOCIATION
INC., a corporation,
'
Involuntary Party Plaintiff.
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Just as defendants take issue .with our Statement of
Facts, we dispute certain conclusions and statement of
the facts contained in defendants' brief. While we do
agree with the conclusion of defendants. on Page 3 that
we could not now successfully challenge "the sufficiency
of the steps taken under the statute to create a district,"
we only make this concession because the validating act
was passed to correct any irregularities in connection
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with the creation of the district. As will be demonstrated
hereafter, that was the only intent and effect of the validation act.
Even if we admit the one part of the statement on
Page 4 that "the district has been valid and subsisting at
all times since September 9, 1946," we maintain that we
are correct and we again repeat that from April 5, 1948
to October G, 1952 "the acquisition of a sewer system in
the Salt Lake City Huburban Sewer District as provided
in the resolution of March 18, 1947 and any amendments
thereto, (was) abandoned." Although the district itself
was not legally dissolved or rescinded, it was abandoned
in the full sense of the word abandoned. It was deserted,
forsaken, given up as a lost cause. Without going into
semantics we repeat - i t was abandoned. The original
resolution of September 9, 1946 merely created "a special
improvement district within the area hereinafter described which is located at Salt Lake County, State of
Utah." We, therefore, restate that prior to October 6,
1952 there was no resolution, ordinance, or order implementing the skeleton district, no provision for the acquisition of a sewer system, nor a determination whether
the district was created pursuant to the provisions of
Section 2 to 7 of Chapter 6 (a) (a special assessment district) or pursuant to the provisions of Section 8 of Chapter 6 (a) (a revenue bond district).
Until the commission passed a resolution similar to
the resolution of March 18, 1947 (subsequently rescinded
April 5, 1948) signifying that the district was no longer
abandoned, we repeat, the district was to all intents and
2
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pnrpo~t>~ defunct and abandoned. ':Phe minutes ol' the

County Commi:.-~ion, the record in thi:.- en:.-P, lPad~ to no
other conclusion.
·on Page 7 of defendant's brief, the i1nplication is
given that li,-!:2-i owiH'r~ filed without prote~t. \Ye admit
that application~ for service frmu this number were filed
hut we claim, and if evidence was taken we would prove,
that a majority of the :2,{}-l-.) persons who signed the
Holladay protest, because of roerrion, are a1nong the
G,-!:2-i. Furthermore, the Court should bear in mind, that
defendant~ did not make available to the citizens a fonn
for filing under protest.
\Ye take serious exception to the statement of the
first paragraph on Page 8. The presentation at the mass
meetings were not detailed, presented only the affirinative ~ide of the picture, and the plan~ presented were not
based on a feasibility report, nor did they confonn cmnpletely to what was finally incorporated in the bonding
resolution. The suggestions and objections were not met.
To cite Exhibits S as support for this is false. The exhibit, which is only minutes of a meeting, states: "Different phases of the sewer plan were discussed. The
oral agreements reached at this 1neeting are to be put
in writing and approved* * *." The record fails to show
what the agreements were, and the minutes fail to show
that the commission approved anything suggested. On
the contrary, three of those persons representing the
opposition at this meeting are now mmnbers of the plain- .
tiff's assoeiation and, as officers, are still attempting
through the association's efforts to have the objections of

3
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2,645 protestants met. Further, the deadline for applications, extended to September 2, 1952, had passed prior
to this meeting; in order to coerce more people into
signing applications, the deadline was thereafter "graciously" extended to those who had signed the Holladay
protest. As to defendants' challenge, the association's
members are prepared to stand and be counted. The issue
is not, however, how many members we have or how
many applications were filed or how many protest signahues were received. The issue is, has the County Commission act validity or, on the contrary, as any property
owner been deprived of his rights by the misapplication
of an unconstitutional statute and by the defendantR'
arbitrary and unreasonable acts.
Defendants lay great emphasis throughout their
brief on the nun1ber of types of applications. Although
five methods of applying for service might have been
finally available, only two exhibits-one and four were
publicized originally. It is admitted by the defendants
that of those owning existing houses not a single person
paid cash under the contract known as Exhibit 5 and only
six posted .the $54.00 bond under the application known
as Exhibit 4; the remainder signed Exhibit 1, the publicized application thus subjecting their property to a lien.
On numerous occasions defendants state that only one
of the five methods of applying for service provided for
a lien if ·the bill became 90 days delinquent. We refer
the court to these exhibits and submit that four of
the five exhibits have the lien provision and only Exhibit
4 omits this lien provision.
4
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Finally we ~nb1nit t11a.t defendant'~ empha~iH on tlw
percentage who haYe filed applications completely ignores the a<hnissions 1nade in their pleadings. In order
to ::'eenre this percentage of application~. a penalty wa~
threatened, which according to defendants' own adinis~ion in Parag-raph G of their AnHwer wa~ ••eoer::-;ivP in
nature."

POIXT I
LACK OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY.
(a) CHAPTER 23 B, LAWS OF UTAH, 1947, DOES NOT
VALIDATE THE COMMISSION'S POWER TO ISSUE REVENUE BONDS.

Defendants' first point in its brief is that the validation act, Chapter 23 B, Laws of Utah 1947, is ail the statutory authority needed. Although it was originally clailned that this act ratified all acts taken prior to May 13,
1947, the gist of defendants' n1ain affirmative defens~
is that this validation act gives legislative sanction to
everything that has been done.
In reply to this argument, we believe that the act itself should be paraphrased in order to detennine its true
meaning. Because the act is all one sentence, it appears
more involv~d than it really is. We submit that the act
states the following: If a Board of County Commissioners purporting to act under the authority of Chapter 6
(a) had theretofore purported to create a sanitary district and had theretofore provided for the issuance of
revenue bonds, all proceedings in connection with the
project were validated, ratified, and corfirmed despite
5
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any irregularities, and despite any failure to observe
statutory requirements as to filing of petitions. rrhe
provisions of all prior proceedings were declared to be
valid and enforceable and the Board was authorized to
proceed with the issuance of bonds and to make changes
in the details of the bonds thereafter. When the bonds
were delivered and paid for, they were declared to be
valid and binding and fully negotiable.
We do not dispute defendants' citations but we do
clailn that there are limitations on the curative power
of the legislature.
Where there is no law authorizing the commission's
actions or where there is no power to act because of lack
of jurisdiction, the legislature cannot retroactively grant
the power. See Daggett v. Lynch, 18 Utah 45, 5-± P. 1095
and in re Christensen's Estate, 17 Utah 412, 53 P. 1003.
Chapter 23 B was not enacted as a retroactive grant of
power nor was it meant to serve as retrospective authority, but it was enacted only for the purpose of curing irregularities or failures to comply with existing statutory
requirements. To construe this deliberate corrective
legislation to be retroactive enabling legislation would be
attributing more to the act than the legislature ever intended.
We sub1nit that the sole purpose of this act was to
cure any irregularities which may have occurred in the
c;reation of the district prior to ~1arch 13, 1947 and to
validate, ratify, and confirm any actions taken prior to
March 13 to issue revenue bonds, regardless of whether
or not the statutory requirements had been complied
6
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with. r:ro impute nwre to this aet requires g-oing- heyond
the terms of the act itself, and require~ presuming that
a prospective effeet rather than the retroad iYP ,·ali dation was intended by the legislature.
The legislature may validate actions taken prior to
the time of the passage of an act. It cannot and certainb·
did not intend to validate, ratify, and confirm actions to
he taken by a Board of County Com1nissioners without
knowing what such actions would he. A~ stated hy defendants, Chapter ~3 B, Law~ of Utah 1947 was passed
~[arch 13, 19-!7. On this date, the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County had by a resolution and
an order dated September 9, 1946, created a special improvement district. The County Commission and the
Fiscal Agent was justifiably concerned whether the statutory requirements that a petition of "10% of the people"
be filed had been 1net. To avoid this question, the validation act was passed. After it was passed the first resolution, the ordinance, and the bonding resolution of March
18, 1947, was passed by the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County. How can the defendant-;
claim that the act of :March 13, 1947, expressly validated
the proceedings thereafter taken by the Board on l\iarch
18, 1947, particularly when the act contains the word
"heretofore"?
'Vhile it is true that the validation act was not approved until March 19, 1947 and did not hecome effective
until l\Iay 13, 1947, curative legislation should not be
given prospective effect.
"\Ye are acquainted with the rules of law that a stat-

7
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ute should be construed in relation to its effective date,
however, we have been able to find a case which interprets a curative act such as the one under discussion.
Rather than to adopt an unreasonable interpretation
that the legislature intended to validate proceedings
taken subsequent to the passage of the legislation but
prio~ to the effective date of the legislation, it is more
logical to determine that the legislature intended to
validate only those proceedings that had heen taken prior
to the enactment. See Snidow v. l\iontana IIome for the
Aged, 292 P. 72:2 where the Supreme Court of .Jfontana
held that a curative act "operates only on conditions already existing, and, in a sense can have no prospective
operation * * *. It goes without saying that the curative
provision of the 1927 amendment was designed to cure
defects in past transactions."
·(b) CHAPTER 6 (a), TITLE 19, DOES NOT CONFER
THE NECESSARY POWERS.

In attempting to answer our contention (original
brief, pp. 11, et seq.) that Section 8 of Chapter 6a, Title
19, U. C. A., 1943, confers no authority upon Boards of
County Commissioners to engage in revenue bond financing except in connection with projects and special improvements appropriate and possible under the laws of
the United States relating thereto, the defendants arrive
somehow at the c~mclusion that the language of the first
sentence of Section 8 authorizes such financing for any
type of project or special improvement created as provided by Section 1 of Chapter 6a, supra, (defendants'
brief, pp. 16 and 17). The least that can be said of this
8
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conclusion i~ that it ignon~~ the express and unambiguous
language and the grannnatical constrndion of the find
sentence of Section~' ~upra, particularly the word~ "~ueh
of said projecb and special improve1nent~." 1'he fir~t
:-'entence of Section .S, ~u pra, must be analyzed as follow~:
•"The board of countY eonunissioner~ of anY
county creating special i;nprovement~ as herei~
before described (as described in Heetion 1 of
Chapter (ia) i:; hereby authorized to ereate and
operate such of said proj~ts and ~pecial improYPInents (such of the projects and special improvements described in ~ection 1 of Chapter 6a) a~
may be appropriate and possible under the laws
of the United ~tates relating thereto (under Act:-:
of Congress), as self-liquidating projects, and in
connection thereu·ith (in connection with such of
the projects and special improve1nents described
in Section 1 as are appropriate and possible under
Acts of l'ongre~s relating thereto) to enter into
the necessary contracts with the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation of the l~nited States, or 'vith
any other private or public agency, person, corporation, or individual, for the purpose of providing funds with which to finance the proposed
project or improveuwnt (one of those described
in Section 1 which is appropriate and possible
under Acts of Congress." (Italics and bracketed
interpolation supplied.)
Clearly there is nothing in the foregoing sentence that
justifies the conclusion that the financing authorized is
for "both types of projects and special improvements"
(defendants' brief, p. 17). The authorization is expressly
limited by the words such of said p1·ojects (projects authorized to be created by Section 1) as may be appro priate or possible under Acts of Congress and by the words
9
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"in connection therewith" which can refer only to the preceding words "such of said projects," etc. There is no
conjunctive or disjunctive in the pertinent language and
nothing else that suggests an "either or both" meaning.
Nor is there anything that is susceptible of the "alson
construction urged by the defendants in their argument
on p. 17 of their brief.
The construction which we urge is a reasonable one,
the defendants to the contrary notwithstanding. In our
main brief (p. 12, et seq.) we discuss the federal statute
(the E1nergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932) to
which Section 8, supra, was so obviously geared and
which most certainly prompted the addition of Section 8
to the measure in committee. The defendants voice no
disagreement with this construction except to say that
Section 8 was merely supplementary to Section 1 and
authorizes the borrowing of money on revenue bond
issues from private sources in connection with projects
created and operated as authorized under Section 1 of
the Act as well as in connection with projects "operated
under appropriate laws of the United States" (Defendants' brief, page 16). As we have demonstrated above,
there is no basis for this construction because Section 8
clearly limits the authority therein contained to financing
in connection with "such of said project:;;" (those described in Section 1) as may be appropriate and possible
under the laws of the United States relating thereto. This
is enabling legislation. The Legislature had no way of
knowing precisely what projects or special improvements
might be financed with Federal assistance then, or in the

10
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future, because the Federal Statute (Section G05h of the
~~mergency Relief and Construction Act of 1D:t2) referred only to aid in the financing of projects "authorized
under Federal, Rtate, or 1nnnicipal law which are selfliquidating in character" and the determination as to
what specific type of project8 might be so financed was
left to the rule-making power of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Thi~ explains the use of the language
··~nc-h of said projects and special in1prove1nents as llla)'
he appropriate and possible under the laws of the United
~tate~ relating thereto," as it appears in Section 8.
In effect, the defendants argue in the alternative that
the addition of Section 8 was unnecessary because "Section 1 was itself broad enough" to permit revenue bond
financing (defendants' brief, p. 16) and that the addition
of Section S was merely supplementary to such authority.
This i~ 1nere tautology. Section 1 does not authorize
revenue bond financing. It authorizes boards of County
Commissioners
"to provide for the cost of such special improvements by leryinq asscs.r...·ments against the
property benefited by such special i1nprovemenb:
or by imjwsinq fees, tolls, rrr)nfs or other charges
for the use of such improvements or both."
(Italics supplied.)
The defendants would have the Court hold that the foregoing authorization necessarily carries with it the authority to engage in revenue bond financing fron1 private
sources because the County Cominissioners could not
otherwise carry out the purposes of the Act (defendants'
brief, p. 17). On p. 15 of their brief they argue to the

11
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same effect by stating that districts have no current
funds when created and that laborers and material men
could not be made to wait for payment until a system
is completed and tolls return the cost ; that special assessrnents could not be payable by everyone on an expensive
sewer project in one payment at the beginning of construction. In other words, the defendants would supply
by implication a power which is not expressly conferred,
on the theory that legislative intent would be thwarted
if current funds could not be n1ade available at the outset of the construction of a project. For present pur-.
poses it is unnecessary to debate the question whether
current funds for district purposes could not, if necessary, be supplied by other means, such as the issuance of
revenue anticipation warrants, for example. The issue
before the court is whether the cost of the project or
funds for special il:nprovements could be supplied by
revenue bond financing from private sources. This authority for special financing must be found in Section
R or in Section 1 of Chapter 6 (a), if at all, because other
Utah statutes confer no general authority upon Board..:
of County Commissioners for such financing and it certainly is not an inherent power of such Boards to issue
revenue bonds. Section 8 of Chapter 6 (a) confers only
a limited authority for revenue bond financing which
does not include revenue bond financing from private
sources and Section 1 in no way relates solely to providing the cost of special improvements by levying assessments or by imposing charges for the use of the improvemerits. From the power to provide the cost of a special

12
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improven1ent hy entunerated methods there may not he
implied the power to provide ~uch cost h~T other mean~,
howen•r, nnsati~fartory the entunerated methods may be.
~[ark-Nasfell Y. City of Ogden, decided by this court
.\ugust :27, 195:2. In thi:-; case the court clearly laid down
the rule that grant~ of power to a municipality are to be
strictly construed, and l.l r. Justice Henroid, speaking
for the majority of the court, quoted with approval the
:::tatement in its previous decision, in the case of Salt
Lake City Y. RaYene, 1:2-t P. 2nd 537 that, "any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the evidence of
·power is resolved by the courts against the corporation
and the power denied.'' Contrary to defendants' bold
assurance that "there can be little doubt that the County
Commission had the power to borrow n1oney" hy revenue
hond financing through private sources, we respectfully
submit that the County Commission was totaling lacking
in such authority.
(c) THE DEFENDANTS' CONSTRUCTION IS NOT A
CONSISTENT ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION.

Defendants' argument (defendants' brief, p. 18) that
the Boards' interpretation of Section 8, supra, is entitled
to judicial respect because it has been consistent over the
years is without merit, because we do not have here a
long-standing administrative interp·retation of the type
contemplated by the line of cases which established the
legal principle relied upon by defendants. So far as we
know, the project in controversy is the only instance of
action under the statute involving revenue bond financing, and the defendants apparently know of no other
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instance because they refer only to the "board's construction in 1947 and again in 1952" (defendants' brief, p.
18). Two wrongs five years apart do not make a right as
"consistent administrative interpretatjon" within the
principal of the decisions relied upon.
If we are to rely on this single administrative construction by one County Board, we would be delegating
this Court's right of interpreting the law to the unjudicial
judgment of an executive body.
(d) THE LEGISLATURE IS NOT PRESUMED TO
HAVE ADOPTED THE DEFENDANTS' CONSTRUCTION IN
PASSING THE VALIDATING ACT.

For similar reasons, the argument by defendants
(defendants' brief, p. 19) that the validation act of 1947
approved the construction placed upon the act by the
board of County· Commissioners, is without merit. The
va:lidating act by its title and by its text relates to the
curing of "errors and irregularities" in proceedings for
the creation of sanitary districts and the authorization of
the issuance of revenue bonds. It does not purport to
validate proceedings or bond authorizations which were
originally unauthorized. A usurpation of power can
hardly be termed an "error or irregularity." It is clear
that someone went to the Legislature and represented
that a sanitary district had been created and that some
time in the future revenue bonds were to be issued pursuant to the authority conferred by Chapter 6(a), Title 19.
supra, but that a validating act was desirable because of
possible errors and irregularities in the proceedings for
the creation of such district, and that legislative action
14
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,,·a~ needed if the rt>venue bonds were to be n<'gotialllP
when i~~ued. The Legislature, arting upon this representation, enacted the validating act whieh does nothing
more than cure any errors or irregularities in proceedings for the creation of projerts and special improvemenb appropriate and possible under the laws of the
rnited States relating thereto and finanring authorization in connection there"·ith. It does not yalidate errors
and irregularities in connection with any other type of
project or any other type of financing and it does not
rure any original lack of authority.
How could the legislature expressly recognize and
then ratify the construction placed upon the act by the
Salt Lake County Comn1ission prior to the time the cOinmission had construed the statute 1 When the validation
act was passed by the legislature the only action taken
h~· the Commission was to create the district and define
its boundaries. Legislative recognition of the prior construction by the County Cmnmission is not entitled to be
given any weight by the court when there was no official .
construction by the County Commission prior to the passage of the validating act.

POINT II
THE DEFENDANTS' ACTION UNDER CHAPTER 6 (a)
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Defendants in their brief have succinctly stated their
position in respect to constitutional guarantees of due
process. On page 41, the last sentence of the second paragraph, they state:
"HP(·ause in the sale of rPY<>nue bonds, the

15
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district does not pledge the private property in
the districts nor obligate itself to assess or tax
the property of the district nor create a burden
on the property in the district, it is not the taking
property, and the due process clauses simply do
not apply."
As pointed out in our main brief, we cannot agree with
this conclusion. Furthermore, as discussed in our brief,
we con tend that the rules of the "special fund" doctrine,
that is revenu~ bond financing, have been so breached
under defendants' sewer plan, that the rules of the
"special fund" doctrine simply do not apply in this case.
On Pages 8 and 40 defendants state there were four
payment methods available without lien provisions. The
Court's attention is directed to the five application forms
submitted as exhibits with defendants' answer.
Exhibit 1, the application for individual user, carries
the lien provisions.
Exhibit 2, the multiple user application, carries the
lien. provision.
Exhibit 3, the application for the owner of three or
more vacant lots, carries the lien provision.
Exhibit 4, the individual application fonn which does
not carry the lien provision but requires 18 months advance payment deposit.
Exhibit 5, the provision for the payment of $750.00 in
full and right to convert from time payment to full payment within a two-year period, carries the lien provision.
Exhibits 3 and 5, to the best of our knowledge, were
not provided for or available until after September 2,
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1~)5~, after the Holladay petition wa.s filed and protm.;t
made to the Connnission. Hence for practical purposeH
they were not available to the public.
The leaflets (referred to page li, defendants' brief)
printed and distributed hy the Counnission had the following to ::-;ay with respect to liens on property:
"16. \Yill the Application Place a lien on 1\I:· Property'? K o. But the application will provide
for a lien taking effect if owner becomes delinquent in payn1ents to the district. Any user
who objects to this lien feature can pay hi~
eonnection fee in full, $150 or $250 as stated
above, at the time he applies for service. Since
it ha:-' been paid, no provision need he
Inade for its collection. On the mopthly service charge any person can post a bond or
cash in the auwunt of $;)-t to assure payrnent
for 1S months service and the application
card will 1nake no reference to a lien.

'"17. Can I avoid a lien on jf y Property if I an1
X ot Able to Pay Cash and Post the $54"?
Yes. There will never be a lien on your property if you pay your own hill as agreed. The
lien becmnes effective onl)· when you are 90
days or more delinquent. The lien can be
placed on record only where your account is
6 months past due. The lien is released when
your bill is paid. For exaruple, after you have
paid the connection fee and your house service line charge, the bill for 6 months service
will be only $18. This would be the extent
of the lien and it could be released hy paying
the $18 and collection charges, if any.
"lEt vVill There he a Lien on 1\f ~· Property to Se<·lue the unpaid Rills of Others 1 No. The
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lien attaches only for your own delinquent
bills.
"19. What if I refuse to Sign Application or Connect with the Sewer~ As in other communities
where a sanitary sewer system is installed,
a County Ordinance will require property
owners to connect after sewer service is avail.
able and that all other methods of disposal is
abandoned, with penalties for non-compliance."
Defendants attempt to persuade the Court that the signing of applications carrying the lien provision was entirely voluntary-a voluntary contract free from any
coercion. The Court's attention is directed to "Exhibit
U," the first resolution adopted l\farch 18, 19-t-7; page 4,
Section 4 of the resolution reads:
"That it being the intention to finance the
installation of said sanitary sewer system and
treatment and disposal plant under the issuance
of revenue bonds which will be payable from the
revenues to be derived from the operation of
the system, and since it is contemplated that the
charges to be made to the users of the system will
constitute liens against the property in said district, enforceable in the event of a default in the
payment of such charges, based either upon the
provisions of a service application agreement to
be signed by the owners of said property or otherwise, this resolution shall be filed for recording
in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake
County and when so recorded shall constitute notice to all persons of the existence, either present
or future, of such liens on the property in said
district." (Italics ours.)
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( Heean~e of thi~ provision, eYPry ah~traet on
property in the distrirt notes this possible lien.)
The people were led to believe that they might
as well sign the application, even though it had a lien
provision, since a lien would result in any event, and h~'
~igning the application they could at least save the .
$100.00 listed as a penalty for late sig·ning. This is the
$100.00 penalty \vhich in their brief, defendants call an
inducement (page -18) but which in their pleading, (paragraph 6 (e) they admit was "coercive in nature." On page
50 of defendants' brief with respect to our allegation that
the County would shut off the culinary water if the service bill were not paid, defendants state:
"'"Che sewer district does not own nor control
the water supply going to the residents of the
~e,,·er district. The 1nost it can do is request cooperation of a water cmnpany in this regard; and
this request could hardly render the proceeds
void.''
Have the defendants conveniently forgotten the provisions of Section XII, paragraph 13, found on page 37 of
"Exhibit U" ~ It reads:
"The Board will require the occupant of an~r
premises, the owner of which shall be delinquent
for more than six months in the payment of the
sewer charges imposed hereunder to cease to dispose of sewage or industrial or commercial wastes
originating fron1 or on such premises by discharge
thereof into the system nntil such delinquent
charges with all penalties for delinquencies shall
have been paid, and, in order to enforce the pro-·
visions of this paragraph and to prevent the creation of a health hazard, it i~ agrees that if any
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such occupant shall not cease such disposal at th·~
expiration of a period of 30 days running from th~
giving of the notice to cease such disposal, it shall
be the duty of any private or public board, body
or person supplying water to or selling water for
use on such premises to ceas~ supplying water to
or selling water for use on such premises withir.
five days after the receipt of notice of such delinquencies from the board, and if such public o!·
private corporation, board, body or person shall
not at the expiration of such five day period cease
supplying water to or selling for use on such
premises, then the Board shall be entitled to enter
upon such premises, and it shall through an agent
or employee so enter and shall sh'ltt off the suzJply
of water to such premises." (Italics ours.)
We submit that the number who signed Exhibit 1 (6,170,
according to defendants' answer) as compared to thd
number who signed Exhibit 4 ( 6, according to defendants'
answer) adequately shows the effectiveness of this plan
of "voluntary" subscription.
Defendants in proposing the sewer pian, and now
in their brief have used revenue bond finance measures
where and when revenue bond financing suited their purpose. They have used police power arguments, where and
when police powers suited their purpose. They have used
the features of assessment financing, where and when it
suited their purpose. The rules of law relating to each
are clear when each is confined to its appropriate sphere.
Defendants have wrapped all of these features into a plan
which they call "revenue bond financing" and attempt
to justify the plan by segregating the plan into compact
units and quoting law to support it within its unit sphere.
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As pointed out in ou1; nmin brief, the plan considered
as a whole, contains so many elenwnts of police power
regulations, a~sessment financing, and revenue bond financing, as to renwve the plan frorn the protection and
rules of the "special fund" doctrine, and subjects the entire plan to the usual constitutional protections-including that of due process.
\Ve submit that the above quoted proyisions of the
resolutions and contracts, disregarding what may havP
been said at mass n1eetings, or ''hearings" are, sufficient,
we believe, to warrant the Court in hdding that tl~e pre~
ent plan is outside the scope of the "special fund" doctrine and that the due proeess clauses certainly do apply
in the present cast. \Ve believe that the above quoted provisions of the resolutions and contracts are sufficient
to warrant the Oourt. in holding that coercive means
inherent in the proposed sewer system plan were suffi·~ient to vitiate the voluntary features required under
the "special fund" doctrine.

POINT III
THE EFFECT OF THE REPEALING RESOLUTION OF
OCTOBER 6, 1952.

We cannot agree that ever sine(-. October 6, 1952 the
status of proceedings in the district is exactly as it was
on April 4, 1948. Affirmatively some $90,000 in advance
payments was returned by the trustee; the public was
led to believe that the Board intended to take no further
action through the district to furnish sewer facilities;
negatively the Board took no official action to revive an
ahandoned project or to formally revive the commission'R
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authority to act for the district.
Defendants have ignored or bru.-:;hed aside the issues
raised under Point 3 of our main brief. We believe that
these illegal, arbitrary, and capricious acts of the defendants cannot be justified on the broad ground that once a
district is organized, its officers may run rough-shod
over the rights of the people. Granted that the end is
meritorious-the furnishing of a badly needed sewe1
project-this does not justify using any means, no mattei
how dictatorial they 1nay be.
POINT IV
THE OCTOBER 6, 1952 RESOLUTIONS SHOULD BE DECLARED ILLEGAL AND VOID.

A considerable part of Point 4 of our main brief detailed and discussed the so-called •'amendments." Our
purpose was to refute Para·graph 11 of defendants' answer which reads as follows : "That the amendments to
the proceedings which were validated, as is alleged in
Paragraph 10 hereof, were relative to formal matters,
which have in no way affected or diminished the effect of
the validation act of 1947."
This allegation, we believe, has in no way been supported in their brief, but on the contrary their defense
has been changed. Thus on Page 59 of their brief, it is
stated, "Defendants do not rely on the validating act for
authority to make the amendments which petitioners detail on Page 60 of their brief; .they rely on Chapter 6 (a),
Title 19, Utah Code Annotated 1943."
In other words, we must now conclude that the two
bond resolutions of October 6, 1952 were not passed to
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accomplish .. changes in the details of said bonds" hut
wt>re new re~olutions enacted to acquire and finance an
entirely different project than originally conte1nplated
by the original sig·ners of the petition. No longer do defendants clai1n legislative ratification of the proceeding;;
under review but assert that acts •·have statutory authorization invigorated by Chapter :23 B .• ,
\Yith this concession in n1ind, we insist that it wa~
mandatory on the defendants to answer our pleadings in
our brief wherein we raised specific illegal affirmative
and negative acb. Instead of u~eeting these issues
squarely, the present position of the defendants is:
Chapter 6 (a) gives the Commission broad and unlimited
authority to create a sewer district and to finance the
cost by revenue bonds fron1 private sources; constitutional guarantees do not apply, and ~pecific objections
should not be exan1ined or passed upon now by thi"
court because no one's property has been confiscated anrl
the illegal phase of the plan may not be put into effect.
The position of the plaintiff, on the contrary, is that this
~uit has for one of its main purposes the testing of the
legality of the October 6, 1952 resolutions wherein the
defendants have adopted the final steps of the sewer plan.
All that remains to be done is letting the construction
contracts and selling and issuing the revenue bonds.
Certainly it is opportune to adjudicate the issues now
hefore third party rights intervene. Specifically, the following provisions of the resolutions, alleged as illegal
ads in our pleading and demonsh·ated to be arbitrary
and unreasonable in our main brief, have not been answered:
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1.

The validity of the rescinding resolutions (Page

59-61).

2. The ultra vires act of permitting the Fiscal
Agent to fix the interest rate to be paid (Page 62).
3. The indefiniteness of the resolutions (Page G3).
4. Proceeding without a feasibility report (Pages
64-65 ).

5. Authorizing bonds in excess of estimated cost
(Pages 64-65).
6. Reservation of the right to determine options and
maturities of one fourth of the authorized issue (Pages
65-66).
7. Lack of hearings on the final plan prior to adoption (Pages 66-69).

We believe that the people of the district can look
to this court to prevent such arbitrary acts jeopardizing
their property and welfare and need not, as defendants
argue, depend sole'ly on the judgment of officials over
whom they have no control.
TheTefore, it is respectfully submitted that our
prayer be granted and that the defendants be prohibited
from proceeding under the present plan.
Respectfully submitted,
ALVIN I. 'SMITH
HERBERT F. SMART
Attorneys for Involuntary Party
Plaintiff
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